A classified U.S. intelligence assessment has concluded that Saudi Arabia has not ruled out pursuing a nuclear weapons program, adding a new layer of scrutiny to a civil nuclear agreement that could eventually give the kingdom access to uranium enrichment on its own soil.
The assessment was provided to members of Congress as they review the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement signed in July, according to The Washington Post. The pact is designed to open Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear market to U.S. technology, reactors and fuel — but unlike Washington’s agreement with the United Arab Emirates, it does not require Riyadh to permanently renounce uranium enrichment.
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| Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Photo: Saudi Press Agency / Saudi Photos / CC BY-SA 4.0. |
That distinction is now at the center of the congressional debate. The agreement creates a potential path toward enrichment below 5% initially and, after additional review and bilateral approval, possibly to levels approaching 20%, according to analyses of the documents submitted to Congress.
What the intelligence assessment says
The Washington Post reported on September 25 that classified intelligence material sent to Capitol Hill concludes that Saudi leaders have not excluded the possibility of eventually developing nuclear weapons.
The assessment does not say Riyadh has decided to build a bomb or that a weapons program is currently underway. Rather, it addresses Saudi Arabia’s long-term strategic options as the kingdom develops a civilian nuclear infrastructure.
That distinction matters because Saudi officials have repeatedly described their nuclear plans as peaceful.
Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman has said the kingdom’s civilian nuclear program will operate with what he called high levels of responsibility and transparency. The U.S. State Department, responding to the Washington Post report, said Washington “does not and will not support a Saudi nuclear weapon program.”
The classified intelligence judgment nevertheless gives lawmakers a different assessment to weigh alongside the administration’s public assurances.
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| Editorial illustration by EastoraNews |
Why enrichment is the central issue
Civilian nuclear power does not by itself require a country to possess uranium-enrichment technology. Reactor fuel can be imported from foreign suppliers, as many nuclear-energy states already do.
Saudi Arabia, however, has long argued that it should be able to develop parts of the nuclear fuel cycle domestically, including enrichment.
Under the agreement submitted to Congress, that possibility is not permanently excluded.
Analyses by the Arms Control Association and Carnegie Endowment say the pact differs from the so-called “gold standard” agreement Washington signed with the UAE in 2009. Abu Dhabi committed to forgoing domestic enrichment and reprocessing; Riyadh has made no equivalent permanent commitment.
The Saudi agreement instead establishes a process under which the two governments can study whether domestic enrichment is commercially and strategically justified.
According to documents and reporting reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, an initial enrichment program could operate below 5%, the range commonly used for power-reactor fuel. A later agreement could permit enrichment to levels below 20%.
Twenty percent is an important technical threshold. Under standard nuclear terminology, uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235 is considered highly enriched uranium. Material below that threshold remains classified as low-enriched uranium, although increasing enrichment from natural uranium to near 20% accomplishes a substantial portion of the technical work required to reach much higher concentrations.
The agreement does not authorize Saudi Arabia to produce weapons-grade uranium, which is generally enriched to around 90%.
Congress gets a 90-day review
The Trump administration submitted the nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress on August 24, triggering the review process required under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Congress has 90 days of continuous session to examine the agreement. Unless lawmakers enact a joint resolution blocking it, the pact can take effect without an affirmative approval vote.
Section 123 agreements provide the legal framework required before the U.S. can transfer major nuclear technology, reactor equipment or nuclear material to another country. They also establish safeguards covering peaceful use, physical security, international monitoring and U.S. consent over sensitive activities such as enrichment and reprocessing.
The Saudi agreement has already drawn scrutiny from both parties.
A group of 15 senators — 13 Democrats and two Republicans — asked the administration this month to declassify and release information accompanying the deal, including classified side letters. Lawmakers argued that Congress needs access to the full arrangement to assess its nonproliferation implications.
House Democrats have separately introduced a resolution of disapproval seeking to prevent the agreement from taking effect.
The safeguards question
Another point of debate is how Saudi nuclear facilities would be monitored.
Riyadh is preparing to give the International Atomic Energy Agency greater inspection and verification powers, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said earlier this month. But Saudi Arabia has not committed to adopting the agency’s Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors broader access to information and locations, including the ability to investigate undeclared nuclear activity.
Grossi said the arrangements being developed for Saudi Arabia would go beyond the kingdom’s existing safeguards obligations and provide additional oversight of sensitive activities such as uranium conversion, enrichment and reprocessing.
Supporters of the agreement argue that these mechanisms, combined with U.S. involvement in the Saudi nuclear program, give Washington more visibility and influence than Riyadh might offer if it instead turned to Russia or China for nuclear technology.
Nonproliferation specialists who have criticized the deal argue that allowing a new state to develop enrichment capabilities creates a precedent that other U.S. partners may seek to follow.
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| Editorial illustration by EastoraNews |
Mohammed bin Salman’s earlier statement
Concerns over Saudi intentions are also shaped by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s own public remarks.
In a 2023 interview with Fox News, he said that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek one as well.
“If they get one, we have to get one,” he said.
That statement has repeatedly surfaced in the congressional debate because it links Saudi Arabia’s nuclear calculations directly to the regional balance with Iran.
The current U.S. intelligence assessment does not establish that Riyadh has made such a decision. But it indicates that U.S. agencies do not consider the weapons option to have been definitively closed.
What happens next
Congress is now considering two separate questions that increasingly overlap: whether the civil nuclear agreement contains enough safeguards to prevent diversion toward military use, and how much weight lawmakers should give to the classified intelligence assessment of Saudi Arabia’s longer-term intentions.
The most consequential provisions may not take effect immediately. Domestic enrichment would require additional steps, technical arrangements and U.S. approval before Saudi Arabia could move toward producing its own fuel.
But once enrichment infrastructure exists, the debate changes.
For Congress, the issue is therefore not whether the agreement gives Saudi Arabia a nuclear weapon. It does not. The question is whether Washington should help establish a civilian nuclear system that leaves Riyadh with more fuel-cycle capability than previous U.S. agreements with regional partners — at a time when American intelligence says the kingdom has not completely closed off its military option.
Sources: The Washington Post; Reuters; Associated Press; U.S. Department of State; Arms Control Association; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; International Atomic Energy Agency
Source Links
- The Washington Post — Saudis have not ruled out developing nuclear weapons, U.S. intelligence assesses Original Washington Post report
- The Washington Post — reporting on the July U.S.-Saudi agreement and its pathway to domestic enrichment U.S. signs nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia
- Reuters — congressional effort to block the Saudi nuclear agreement U.S. Democrats seek to stop Saudi nuclear deal
- Reuters — IAEA chief Rafael Grossi on expanded Saudi safeguards and monitoring Saudi Arabia preparing enhanced IAEA oversight
- Arms Control Association — detailed review of the U.S.-Saudi agreement, safeguards and enrichment provisions U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement FAQ
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — analysis of how the deal differs from the UAE “gold standard” model Analysis of the Saudi nuclear agreement
- U.S. Department of State — explanation of Section 123 civil nuclear agreements and U.S. nonproliferation requirements 123 Agreements fact sheet