Trump Is Preparing to Govern Without Congress if Democrats Win the Midterms

While Donald Trump campaigns across the United States urging voters to preserve Republican control of Congress, his White House has been preparing for the possibility that voters do the opposite.

For months, senior officials have been studying how much of Trump’s agenda could continue without new legislation if Democrats capture the House, the Senate or both in Tuesday’s midterm elections. The planning is not limited to one policy area. It stretches across immigration, tariffs, housing, federal spending, visas and the rules governing how government money is distributed.

The objective is straightforward: if Congress becomes hostile, move as much power as possible into parts of government the president still controls.

President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office on Sept. 4, 2026, as his administration increasingly relies on presidential authority to advance policy. Photo: Abe McNatt / The White House. Public Domain.

That strategy would not allow Trump to ignore Congress altogether. A Democratic majority could block legislation, refuse to confirm nominees, investigate the administration and use control over appropriations to constrain parts of the president’s agenda. Courts could also strike down executive actions that exceed legal authority.

But the White House appears to believe that Congress can obstruct Trump without necessarily stopping him.

The administration has spent nearly two years testing that proposition.

The planning began months before the election

According to Reuters, White House officials have been working on the post-midterm strategy since April.

Stephen Miller, the White House deputy chief of staff and one of the most influential architects of Trump’s immigration policy, has been involved alongside Russell Vought, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, and lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office.

Will Scharf, the White House counsel, and his team have been examining what Trump can legally do without congressional approval, how far presidential authority can be stretched and how the administration could defend aggressive executive actions once they are challenged in court.

Federal agencies have also been asked to identify policies that can be implemented under existing law rather than waiting for new legislation.

That includes possible tariffs on critical minerals and wind-turbine imports, tighter visa rules for temporary workers and foreign students, changes intended to reduce housing construction costs and new approaches to distributing federal grants.

The preparation reflects a political reality that has become increasingly difficult for the White House to ignore.

Republicans currently hold narrow majorities in both chambers. Democrats need a net gain of four seats to take the House and four seats to gain control of the Senate. Public polling has generally placed Democrats in a stronger position in the House, while the Senate remains more uncertain.

Trump is therefore campaigning to prevent a divided government while simultaneously preparing to govern inside one.

Trump has already built a presidency around executive power

The White House does not have to imagine from scratch what a more unilateral Trump presidency would look like.

Since returning to office in January 2025, Trump has repeatedly relied on presidential authority to move policy without waiting for Congress.

He has used executive orders and emergency declarations to reshape immigration enforcement, impose tariffs, restructure parts of the federal workforce and direct major elements of foreign policy. His administration has also tested the boundaries of presidential authority over spending and the executive bureaucracy.

The Republican-controlled Congress has still mattered. It passed major tax and spending legislation in 2025 and has confirmed judges and senior officials nominated by the president.

But much of the second Trump presidency has already operated through a model in which Congress provides support when available and executive power fills the gaps when it is not.

A Democratic takeover would make that second part of the model considerably more important.

Nathan Gonzales, the editor and publisher of the nonpartisan political analysis outlet Inside Elections, told Reuters that Trump has already spent much of his second term trying to do as much as possible through executive authority and would likely continue in the same direction if Democrats control Congress.

In that sense, the White House is not planning a new governing philosophy.

It is preparing to intensify one that already exists.

Tariffs may be one of Trump’s strongest tools

Trade policy illustrates why losing Congress would not necessarily leave Trump politically powerless.

Trump has repeatedly used existing statutes to impose tariffs without first obtaining new legislation from lawmakers. That authority has already allowed the administration to make trade policy one of the most powerful instruments of the presidency.

A Democratic Congress could hold hearings, investigate the economic effects of tariffs and pass legislation designed to restrict presidential trade authority.

But Trump could veto such legislation.

Unless Democrats controlled enough seats to override a veto — requiring a two-thirds majority in both chambers — the president would retain substantial room to continue using tariffs.

The White House is reportedly examining additional tariffs on imports including critical minerals and wind turbines.

That matters because tariffs do not merely affect trade.

They can reshape domestic industrial policy, influence relations with China and Europe, alter the cost of energy projects and affect prices paid by American consumers and manufacturers.

A president who cannot persuade Congress to enact a new industrial policy can still use trade authority to produce similar effects from the executive branch.

Immigration is even more suited to unilateral action

Immigration has been another area where Trump has consistently relied on presidential power.

Congress writes immigration law and controls funding, but the executive branch decides how much of that law is enforced, which groups receive priority, how visa regulations are interpreted and how federal immigration agencies deploy their personnel.

The administration is reportedly studying tighter rules for temporary foreign workers and international students as part of its post-midterm planning.

A Democratic Congress could attempt to restrict funding for some immigration operations or pass legislation reversing administration policies.

Trump could veto those measures.

Congressional control would therefore matter, but it would not automatically remove the president’s control over agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department.

That distinction explains why immigration remains one of the areas where the White House appears most confident it can continue advancing policy without Republican lawmakers.

The real fight may be over money

Federal spending presents a more complicated problem.

Congress controls the power of the purse. The Constitution gives lawmakers authority over appropriations, and a president cannot simply create unlimited money by executive order.

That makes spending one of the strongest tools available to a hostile Congress.

Russell Vought, however, is reportedly examining how much of Trump’s agenda could continue using funds Congress has already appropriated.

The administration is also considering changes to federal grant rules that would give political appointees greater influence over which programmes receive money.

That could become one of the most contentious areas of a Democratic-controlled Congress.

The question would not only be whether Congress approves funds, but how much discretion the executive branch has after those funds have been approved.

Trump’s administration has repeatedly argued for broad presidential control over the executive branch and the agencies that administer federal money.

Democrats are likely to argue that the president cannot use administrative discretion to effectively rewrite spending decisions already made by Congress.

If the two sides collide, federal courts would likely become the final arena.

The courts would become even more important

A presidency based heavily on unilateral action inevitably moves political conflict toward the judiciary.

If Congress cannot stop an executive order through legislation, opponents can challenge it in court.

The White House appears to be planning around that reality.

Its lawyers are reportedly considering formal legal opinions from the Justice Department to define how far presidential authority extends and create a legal foundation for policies likely to face litigation.

That strategy can matter even when the administration ultimately loses a case.

Legal challenges take time.

A policy can remain in force for months while litigation moves through district courts, appeals courts and potentially the Supreme Court. Even when judges issue temporary blocks, different courts can produce conflicting rulings before the legal question is finally settled.

This makes delay itself politically relevant.

A president may be able to implement a policy long enough to change conditions on the ground before courts decide whether it was legal.

The administration’s preparation therefore appears focused not only on whether an executive action will ultimately survive but on how to keep it alive through the legal process.

A Democratic Senate would create a different problem

The most immediate limitation on Trump would come if Democrats capture the Senate.

Unlike many executive actions, presidential appointments cannot simply bypass lawmakers.

The Senate confirms Cabinet officials, senior executive branch nominees, federal judges and Supreme Court justices.

If Democrats control the chamber, they could slow or block Trump nominees for the remainder of his term.

That could become particularly consequential if a Supreme Court vacancy emerges.

A Democratic Senate would have little political incentive to quickly confirm a Trump nominee to the country’s highest court, especially during the final two years of his presidency.

The same dynamic would affect lower federal courts and many senior administration positions.

Trump could use acting officials in some circumstances, but acting appointments are governed by legal limits and cannot fully replace Senate confirmation across the government.

A Democratic Senate would therefore possess leverage that executive orders cannot easily neutralise.

The House would have another weapon: investigations

A Democratic House could create problems that are very different from legislative defeats.

Control of congressional committees would allow Democrats to hold hearings, request records, subpoena witnesses and investigate the administration’s use of presidential power.

Senior Democratic lawmakers have already discussed possible investigations into whether Trump has used government authority to benefit himself, his family, political allies or donors.

That is why White House lawyers are not only studying executive orders.

They are also preparing officials for subpoenas.

According to Reuters, administration lawyers have been advising political appointees and agency heads on how to respond to congressional document demands and investigations and have warned officials to be careful about what they put in writing.

The administration has also explored whether executive privilege could be used to protect some communications with private advisers.

Those preparations point toward a familiar type of Washington conflict.

During Trump’s first presidency, congressional investigations repeatedly produced disputes over subpoenas, testimony, executive privilege and access to documents. Some of those battles lasted months or years in court.

A Democratic victory could bring that environment back almost immediately.

Executive privilege could become a central battlefield

Executive privilege allows presidents to protect some confidential communications inside the executive branch, particularly where national security or sensitive presidential decision-making is involved.

It is not unlimited.

Congress also possesses constitutional oversight powers, especially when investigating how federal money is spent or whether laws are being properly implemented.

The White House is reportedly seeking legal guidance on whether executive privilege can also shield some communications between Trump and private advisers outside the formal government structure.

That question could become particularly important because Trump has long relied on informal advisers, family members, political allies and business figures outside traditional government channels.

If congressional committees demand records of those communications, the administration could argue that some are protected because they relate to presidential decision-making.

Democrats would likely argue that executive privilege cannot simply be extended to any private person who advises the president.

The dispute could end up in federal court.

Trump has already named the role he expects to play

Trump himself has publicly acknowledged the possibility of divided government.

In an interview with the New York Post’s Pod Force One podcast, he joked that if Democrats gain control of Congress he may become “Mr. Veto.”

The phrase captures one of the basic realities of the U.S. constitutional system.

Even if Democrats control both chambers, legislation still goes to the president.

Trump can reject it.

Overriding him would require two-thirds majorities in both the House and Senate, a threshold Democrats are extremely unlikely to reach in the 2026 elections.

That means a Democratic Congress could stop Trump’s legislative programme more easily than it could enact its own.

The likely result would be stalemate.

Republicans would lose the ability to pass major legislation on party-line votes. Democrats would gain power to investigate and block. Trump would retain the veto and executive branch.

Washington would become a government in which each side is strong enough to stop the other but rarely strong enough to govern alone.

National emergencies would provide another route

Trump has repeatedly declared national emergencies to expand presidential flexibility.

Emergency declarations can unlock statutory powers that Congress has already placed in law, allowing presidents to redirect resources or impose restrictions without returning to lawmakers for fresh authority.

Congress can vote to terminate an emergency.

But such a resolution can itself be vetoed by the president.

Again, overriding that veto requires a two-thirds majority.

That creates an unusual constitutional structure in which Congress technically retains the power to stop an emergency, but a president supported by even a minority large enough to sustain a veto can make that extremely difficult.

Critics of Trump have argued that repeated use of emergencies can transform powers designed for extraordinary circumstances into normal tools of presidential government.

The White House has generally argued that Trump is using authorities Congress itself created.

That disagreement would become much more important if ordinary legislation is effectively frozen after the midterms.

Foreign policy would remain heavily presidential

A Democratic Congress would also have limited ability to immediately redirect foreign policy.

Congress controls funding, sanctions law and treaty-related powers, but presidents traditionally possess broad authority over diplomacy, military command and day-to-day foreign relations.

Trump has already made extensive use of that authority during his second term.

A Democratic majority could investigate military decisions, limit future appropriations and attempt to impose statutory restrictions on the administration’s foreign policy.

But those measures would often require legislation Trump could veto.

That means policy toward Iran, NATO, Ukraine, China and the Middle East could continue to be driven heavily from the White House even under a hostile Congress.

The institutional conflict would likely move toward funding deadlines, war-powers disputes and oversight rather than giving Congress direct control over foreign policy.

The midterms could produce a presidency with fewer allies but more unilateral instincts

The paradox facing voters is that defeating Trump’s party in Congress would clearly weaken him while potentially making his presidency more dependent on unilateral authority.

A Republican Congress allows Trump to translate parts of his agenda into statute.

A Democratic Congress would make that route largely unavailable.

But the White House response is not to assume that the agenda ends.

It is to identify everything the president can do without lawmakers and prepare legal arguments for doing more.

That can produce a presidency that is weaker legislatively but more aggressive administratively.

Congress could become more powerful as an investigator at the same moment it becomes less relevant to the creation of policy.

The executive branch, meanwhile, could become more constrained by lawsuits and funding battles while relying more heavily on the areas where presidential discretion remains broad.

Democrats would still have significant leverage

None of this means congressional control would be symbolic.

Democrats could refuse to approve new spending priorities, block legislation Trump wants, prevent some nominees from taking office and launch investigations that consume enormous amounts of administration time.

Budget negotiations could become especially confrontational.

Government shutdowns would become more likely if the White House and Congress cannot agree on annual appropriations.

Debt-ceiling or emergency-funding disputes could also become opportunities for each side to force concessions.

Democrats could attach conditions to spending bills and refuse to provide money for initiatives they oppose.

The White House could respond by searching existing statutes and previously approved funds for alternative routes.

Every major budget negotiation could therefore become a test of how far presidential flexibility extends.

The courts may decide where Congress ends and the presidency begins

That is ultimately why the White House legal preparation may prove as important as the political preparation.

A divided government would generate disputes that do not have clean answers in statute.

How much discretion does a president have over money Congress has already appropriated?

How broadly can emergency powers be interpreted?

When can an agency rewrite a regulation without new legislation?

How far can executive privilege extend?

Can a president impose new tariffs indefinitely using old trade laws?

The answers to those questions could shape not only the final two years of Trump’s term but the presidency itself.

Every ruling that expands executive power becomes available to future presidents.

Every ruling that restricts it becomes a precedent Congress can use against the next administration.

The fight after the midterms would therefore not simply be Trump versus Democrats.

It could become another chapter in the long transfer of practical power from Congress toward the presidency.

The White House is preparing for conflict, not paralysis

That is the most revealing part of the Reuters reporting.

The administration is not preparing for a scenario in which Democratic control of Congress forces Trump to abandon his agenda and spend two years negotiating compromises.

It is preparing for a period in which legislation becomes harder, investigations intensify and the presidency looks for alternative routes around congressional resistance.

Trump has indicated that deals may eventually be possible. His “Mr. Veto” comment suggested he expects an initial period of confrontation before negotiating with Democratic leaders.

But the institutional groundwork being laid inside the White House points to a presidency that wants leverage before it reaches the negotiating table.

If Trump can continue imposing tariffs, tightening immigration rules, directing federal agencies and shaping spending through executive discretion, he enters negotiations with Congress from a stronger position.

If courts restrict those powers or Congress successfully controls funding, Democrats gain leverage instead.

Tuesday’s elections will therefore decide more than which party controls committee gavels or the congressional calendar.

They could determine how much of Donald Trump’s second presidency is conducted through Congress at all.

For months, his aides have been preparing their answer.